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1.

INTRODUCTION

This Essay uses the First Amendment jurisprudence of commercial speech to
explain in a partial and preliminary fashion why courts should interpret doctrines
like originality and the idea/expression dichotomy to limit copyright protection for
works that convey basic commercial information about goods or services. These
works, which the Essay calls "commercial information works," include
advertisements (or at least certain aspects thereof), numbering systems, contracts,
financial prospectuses, and commercial labels.
Commercial information works are interesting to study because they differ in
two ways from the books, music, movies, and other works at the heart of copyright.
First, commercial information works often present weak cases for copyright
because they exhibit relatively low levels of the originality required for copyright.'
Insurance policies must accurately portray the commercial terms of the financial
transactions being promoted, and labels have to depict the commercially significant
*Professor of Law, Law School Fund Scholar, and Director, Emerging Enterprises and Business
Law Program, Boston College Law School. Thanks are owed to the editors of the South CarolinaLaw
Review for organizing this symposium, to Esther Chang. David Bartholomew, and Kara Hurvitz for
their research assistance, and to Joe Liu for commenting on an earlier draft. Copyright 2007 by Alfred
C. Yen.
1. See 17 U.S.C. §102(a) (2000) ("Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of
authorship .... ); Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340. 345-47 (1991) (explaining
that originality is a prerequisite to copyright).
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properties of the works in question. Authors therefore have fewer choices to make
when creating these works, making them less expressive than most other works. By
contrast, the vast majority of books, music, and movies fit comfortably within
copyright subject matter because they display copious amounts of the originality
and creativity required for copyright.
Second, copyright protection for commercial information works frequently is
problematic from the standpoint of copyright policy. Copyright generally operates
on the assumption that authors create works for the purpose of selling copies for
profit. However, people create commercial information works to promote the sale
of other things, so they do not expect profits from the sale of commercial
information works. Moreover, commercial information works frequently convey
information that competitors of the copyright holder will want or even need to
repeat. Thus a mutual fund company will create a commercial information work (a
prospectus) to inform potential investors about the salient features of the fund in
question. A competitor who decides to offer an identical fund will also need its own
prospectus containing the same information, and that prospectus will necessarily
resemble closely the first company's prospectus. If copyright allows the first
company to disrupt the sale of the second company's mutual fund shares, 2 then the
first company will have gained a competitive advantage unrelated to copyright's
purpose of encouraging the production of new works.
Courts do not agree about how much these observations matter when applying
copyright to commercial information works. Some courts worry about the
consequences of copyrighting commercial information works and give them little
or no protection. Others seem reluctant to distinguish commercial information
works from other works and grant copyright to commercial information works more
freely.4
The First Amendment becomes relevant to copyright in commercial
information works because copyright restricts free speech. Copyright tells people
that, in certain situations, they may not freely reproduce or distribute particular
books, essays, music, or art.5 Granted, this restriction need not render copyright

2. This would likely happen through an injunction against distribution of the defendant's
prospectus, a remedy that would routinely follow a finding of infringement. See Mark A. Lemley &
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in IntellectualPropertyCases, 48 DuKE L.J. 147,
158-65 (1998); see, e.g.. LGS Architects, Inc. v. Concordia Homes. 434 F.3d 1150. 1155-57 (9th Cir.
2006) granting a temporary injunction preventing use of copyrighted building plans where the defendant
exceeded the scope of the licensing agreement; Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, 387
F.3d 522, 532 33 (6th Cir. 2004) (vacating a preliminary injuction granted in software copyright
action): Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co.. 64 F.3d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming an injuction
granted in software copyright action).
3. See Boyle v. Stephens, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 1351, 1998 WL 80175, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 1998)
(Copyright in plaintiff's prospectus and other materials "does not preclude others from also describing
such fund characteristics as the availability of individual-specific 'series' and the shifting investment
composition. Otherwise, plaintiff could prevent competitors from fully describing the mutual fund
concept in a prospectus or other selling materials a result the copyright laws do not contemplate.").
4. See infra Part 11.
5. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (defining exclusive rights of copyright holders).
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inconsistent with the First Amendment. As many courts have noted, the pro-speech
benefits of appropriately constructed copyright, particularly its stimulation of new
speech, outweigh the costs associated with its suppression of speech. 6 Copyright
therefore remains constitutional as long as courts interpret it with due regard for the
First Amendment. 7 Failure to interpret copyright this way may not violate the
Constitution in any given case, but it surely raises the long-term possibility of a
constitutionally problematic copyright regime that does not serve society's best
interests. Courts should therefore draw lessons from First Amendment
jurisprudence when interpreting copyright.'
As this Essay discusses, the First Amendment can help courts decide whether
to limit copyright in commercial information works. There are, of course, perfectly
understandable reasons to grant broad copyright in these works. Modern copyright
doctrine grants copyright liberally, in part because courts do not want to distinguish
works on the basis of their aesthetic or creative content.9 Moreover, the basic
explanation of copyright's constitutionality makes no distinction between various
types of speech affected by copyright. No one asks whether the encouragement of
computer programs matters more to the First Amendment than the suppression of
fine art. It is therefore easy to understand why some courts overlook the distinctive
characteristics of commercial information works and treat them as if they were
books, movies, or music.
However, additional reflection suggests that this practice may not make sense
if copyright truly takes its interpretive cues from First Amendment jurisprudence.
Courts may express reluctance to distinguish between various types of speech in
copyright, but they do the opposite when deciding First Amendment cases. Indeed,
First Amendment jurisprudence divides speech into a number of constitutionally
significant categories. Obscenity and fighting words receive no First Amendment
protection," while indecent speech, defamation, and commercial speech receive
less protection than do most other forms of speech." If courts distinguish between
various forms of speech in First Amendment cases, perhaps courts should follow
suit in copyright.

6. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (noting that copyright does not conflict with
the First Amendment because it encourages new speech); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 60 (1985) (noting copyright is an "engine of free expression" and rejecting
concerns about conflict between copyright and the First Amendment).
7. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 559-60 (explaining how application of doctrines such as fair use
and the idea/expression dichotomy keep copyright within constitutional limits).
8. The Supreme Court has recently stated that "it is appropriate to construe copyright's internal
safeguards to accommodate First Amendment concerns." Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 n.24.
9. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345, 359 (1991) (noting the level
of creativity needed to support copyright is "extremely low' and copyright's requirement of originality
"is not particularly stringent"); Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239,250 52(1903)
(stating that courts should not judge the artistic merit of works and suggesting there is no need for
meaningful assessment of originality).
10. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (regarding obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 72 (1942) (regarding fighting words).
11. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323. 341 (1974) (regarding defamation).
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The First Amendment jurisprudence of commercial speech is of particular
interest in this regard because it rests on observations particularly germane to
copyright. Commercial speech gets First Amendment protection because it plays
an important role in our market economy. 2 At the same time, however, commercial
speech does not get full First Amendment protection because existing monetary
incentives make the production of commercial
speech quite likely, even if
13
government tries to discourage or suppress it.
When one applies these observations to copyright in commercial information
works, some interesting insights emerge. First, existing commercial incentives for
the production and dissemination of commercial speech imply that copyright has
little effect on the production of commercial speech. Second, the importance of
accurate commercial signals to our economy implies that those signals should be
freely disseminated, not restricted by copyright. Together, these insights imply that
copyright in commercial information works should be carefully limited.14
The Essay proceeds in three steps. Part 11 quickly summarizes copyright's
application to works conveying basic commercial information. Part 111 studies the
First Amendment jurisprudence of commercial speech. Part IV explains how the
First Amendment affects the application of copyright to commercial information
works. Part V concludes with some thoughts about how insights gleaned from the
First Amendment jurisprudence of commercial speech might affect other parts of
copyright law.
11.

COPYRIGHT IN COMMERCIAL INFORMATION WORKS

Two doctrines, originality and the idea/expression dichotomy, heavily
influence the application of copyright to commercial information works. This part
describes how courts interpret these doctrines to reach strikingly different results.
A.

Originalityand CommercialInformation Works

Copyright protects a work only if the work exhibits originality. 5 The Supreme
Court has established that the requirement of originality is modest. 6 It is therefore
fairly easy for most works to gain copyright protection. Nevertheless, copyright
defendants often argue that commercial information works lack sufficient
originality to sustain copyright. Courts differ in their responses to this contention.

12. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
14. See Lisa P. Ramsey. IntellectualProperty Rights in Advertising, 12 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 189, 217 23, 229 33, 246-49 (2006) (noting these characteristics of advertising and
using them to suggest limiting the scope of copyright in advertisements); Note, Rethinking Copyright
forAdvertisements. 119 HARV. L. REv. 2486,2490 92,2501 07 (2006) (noting that advertisements do
not require copyright incentives to ensure production and suggesting limitations on copyright for
advertisements on the basis of the useful article doctrine).
15. See supra note 1.
16. See supra note 9.
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Sassafras Enterprises, Inc. v. Roshco, Inc. 17 exemplifies cases that have
interpreted originality to deny copyright to commercial information works. The
plaintiff, Sassafras, sold pizza stones that came with pamphlets describing the
stones and giving instructions for use, recipes, and promotional statements touting
the quality of the product and relating the history of breadmaking.18 The defendant,
Roshco, also sold pizza stones accompanied by pamphlets that resembled those of
Sassafras. 9 Sassafras objected and sued for, among other things, copyright
infringement. ° Roshco moved for summary judgment on the issue of copyright
infringement,21 and the court granted the motion on the ground that Sassafras's
works lacked sufficient originality.22 According to the court, Sassafras's writing
about the care and use of its pizza stones "flow[ed] from the characteristics and
intended use of the product, not from the imagination of any independent author. '23
Even the recipes and promotional writings touting the quality of the product failed
to exhibit sufficient originality.24
Sassafras is a mildly surprising decision, for Sassafras had an entirely plausible
claim that could easily have survived summary judgment on the issue of
copyrightability. As has already been noted, leading cases state that the copyright's
requirement of originality is lenient. 25 The creation of Sassafras's pamphlet surely
involved at least a small amount of originality, and a jury could easily have found
in favor of Sassafras. Why then did this not happen? The answer lies in the court's
understanding of the relationship between Sassafras's reasons for suing and
copyright policy.
The court began its copyright analysis by describing the case as one in which
an established commercial enterprise responded to competition by suing for
copyright infringement.2 6 Later, the court noted that Sassafras did not sue to protect
incentives provided by copyright.2 The court expressed certainty that Sassafras
would have produced its pamphlets with or without copyright because commercial
imperatives and the nature of its product made the pamphlets necessary. 28 It
therefore made little sense to use copyright to protect Sassafras's pamphlets
' 29
because doing so would give Sassafras "an unwarranted economic advantage. ,

17. 889 F. Supp. 343 (N.D. 111.1995).
18. Id.at 344.
19. d.at 344-45.
20. Id. at 343-44.
21. Id. at 344.
22. Id.at 346-47.
23. Id.at 347.
24. Id.
25. See supra note 9.
26. Id.at 345.
27. Id.at 346.
28. Id.
29. Id.Other cases have denied copyright to commercial information works on grounds of
insufficient originality. See Toro Co. v. R & R Products Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th Cir. 1986)
(holding an arbitrarily designed parts numbering system lacks originality); Alberto-Culver Co. v.
Andrea Dumon, Inc., 466 F.2d 705. 711 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that merely descriptive language on
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By way of contrast, consider the case of Abli, Inc. v. StandardBrands Paint
Co. 30 In Abli, the plaintiff sold strings of plastic beads in packages with these
labels 31:
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product label, including the phrase "most personal sort of deodorant," was uncopyrightable for lack of
originality).
30. 323 F. Supp. 1400 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
31. Id. at 1402, 1406.
32. Id. at 1402.
33. Id. at 1407.
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In response to the plaintiff s claim for copyright infringement, the defendant argued
that the plaintiffs labels were not copyrightable because the labels were merely
descriptive and functional considerations dictated the form of the text.34
Examination of the works at stake inAbli reveals that the defendant had at least
as good a case as Roshco had in Sassafras.As an initial matter, it is hard to see how
phrases like "50 continuous feet of beads permanently attached to nylon cord"
exhibit any originality when they exactly describe the product being sold. Surely
these phrases and Abli's labels did not contain more originality than the pamphlets
authored by Sassafras. Additionally, Abli's suit raised the same policy concerns that
carried the day in Sassafras, for Abli sued to disrupt a competitor's sales of beads
and not to protect copyright incentives derived from the sale of labels.
Despite all of this, the court decided in Abli's favor. 5 Tellingly, the court did
not even mention the policy concerns raised by the case. Instead, the court
apparently believed that the defendant's appropriation was an intrinsic wrong that
had to be stopped. The court stated that "[a]ppropriation of the fruits of another's
labor and skill in order to publish a rival work without the expenditure of the time
and effort required for independently arrived at results is copyright infringement. 36
Accordingly, the court asserted that the only obstacle to copyright was the modest
and easily met requirement of originality, and the plaintiffs victory quickly
followed.3 7
B.

The Idea/ExpressionDichotomy and CommercialInformation Works

Section 102(b) of the copyright code denies copyright to a work's ideas. 8
Copyright contains this limitation because the public would suffer if individuals
could own ideas. All authors borrow ideas from one another. If they had to pay for
the privilege of doing so, the creation of new works would suffer. Accordingly,
copyright strikes a balance between the need to encourage speech through copyright
incentives and the need to make authorship possible by leaving ideas in the public
domain while allowing authors to claim copyright in their individual expression of
ideas.39

34. Id. at 1403.
35. Id.at 1405.
36. Id. at 1404 (quoting Orgel v. Clark Boardman Co., 301 F.2d 119. 120 (2d Cir. 1962).
37. Id. at 1403-04 (quoting Doran v. Sunset House Distrib. Corp., 197 F. Supp. 940. 944 (S.D.
Cal. 1961)). Cases reaching results similar to Abli include Drop Dead Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, 326
F.2d 87, 93 (9th Cir. 1963) (upholding copyright in aerosol wax label); Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v.
Nifty Foods Corp.. 266 F.2d 541. 544-45 (2d Cir. 1959) (holding defendant infringed the pictures on
plaintiff's product labels): X-IT Products, LLC v. Walter Kidde Portable Equipment, Inc., 155 F. Supp.
2d 577, 608 11(E.D. Va. 2001) (holdingproduct's box cover art is copyrightable); Sebastian Int'l, Inc.
v. Consumer Contact (PTY) Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 909, 913 (D.N.J. 1987) (finding text on shampoo bottle
copyrightable). rev'd on other grounds. 847 F.2d 1093. 1099 (3d Cir.1988).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
39. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (explaining contrast between protection of
expression and promotion of ideas); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104-05 (1879) (differentiating
between the idea of an accounting system and a particular book's expression of the proper use of the

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

7

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 2
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58: 665

The idea/expression dichotomy narrows the scope of copyright in a work by
leaving portions of the work free for borrowing. In some cases, the idea/expression
dichotomy even requires the denial of copyright to an otherwise copyrightable
work. This happens when an idea has merged with its expression.
An idea merges with its expression when the idea can be expressed in only a
limited number of ways. In situations like this, allowing individuals to claim
copyright in the expression of such an idea would be tantamount to allowing
individuals to own the idea. For example, if an idea could be expressed in only
three ways, the three people who held copyright in those expressions would
effectively own the idea because no one else could express the idea without
committing infringement. Courts have responded to this possibility by severely
limiting or denying copyright to works whose ideas have merged with their
expression.4 °
The seminal case, Baker v. Selden,4 1 illustrates how the idea/expression
dichotomy sometimes requires limitation of copyright in an otherwise copyrightable
work. The Baker plaintiff owned the copyright in a book explaining a particular
method of double-entry bookkeeping.42 The book included a number of blank forms
that illustrated and could be used to carry out the particular method described in the
plaintiff s book.43 The defendant also produced forms to carry out the same system
of bookkeeping, and these forms were similar, but not identical, to the plaintiff s.44
The plaintiff sued for copyright infringement and won in the lower courts, but the
Supreme Court reversed.45
The Court's decision rested on the distinction between the system of
bookkeeping and the plaintiffs description of the system. A person could claim
copyright in such a description, but copyright did not protect the system being
described. 46 The system therefore remained in the public domain, free for all to
use.4 The Court worried that copyright in the plaintiff s explanation would prevent
free use of the underlying system, and it responded by denying copyright to the

accounting system); Computer Assocs. Int'l Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992)
(describing "delicate equilibrium" between level of copyright that gives authors incentives to create and
limiting such copyright to avoid stagnation from monopoly).
40. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding
the idea of jewel-encrusted "bee" pin was indistinguishable from the expression of that idea, and
therefore there was no copyright protection for plaintiff s pin): Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co.. 379
F.2d 675. 676. 678-79 (1 st Cir. 1967) (holding the idea of distributing rules for sweepstake contest had
merged with the expression of that idea, and therefore there was no copyright protection for plaintiff s
rules); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930) (holding the abstract plot
and characters in a play constituted ideas rather than expression, and therefore there was no copyright
protection for plaintiff's plot and characters).
41. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
42. Id. at 99 100.
43. Id. at 100.
44. Id. at 100-01.
45. Id. at 100, 107.
46. Id. at 104 05.
47. Id. at 105.
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plaintiffs blank forms.48
Baker v. Selden has influenced many courts to limit or deny copyright in
commercial information works.49 For example, in Crume v. Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co.,5 ° the plaintiff claimed copyright in four pamphlets describing the
reorganization of insolvent insurance companies.51 According to the plaintiffs
complaint, the defendant published a "Rehabilitation and Reinsurance Agreement"
that contained "many clauses, paragraphs and parts" of the plaintiff s pamphlets.52
The plaintiff sued for copyright infringement, the district court granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff appealed.53
In affirming the dismissal, the Seventh Circuit effectively denied copyright in
the language borrowed by the defendant, even though the plaintiff duly copyrighted
its pamphlets. 4 Citing Baker, the court distinguished the reorganization plans from
the plaintiff s description of the plans."5 The court then observed that the plaintiff s
claim amounted to a denial of the defendant's ability to use the specific words that
implemented the plans in question. 6 In situations like this, the defendant's use of
the plaintiff s language could not amount to copyright infringement because such
a result would give ownership of the relevant plans to the plaintiff.57 The court
recognized that this result effectively denied copyright in the plaintiffs works, 8 but

48. Id. at 105-06 (quoting Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999. 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2872)):
see also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 816 (1st Cir. 1995) (applying reasoning
from Baker to computer programs functioning as "methods of operation" and finding no copyright
protection): Bibbero Sys., Inc. v. Colwell Sys.. Inc.. 893 F.2d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1990) (denying
copyright in medical claim forms); Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 452 54
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (describing qualities of photographs that indicate protectable originality, which must
exist because the subject, or idea, of a photograph usually cannot be protected).
49. See ATC Distribution Group. Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d
700, 707 10 (6th Cir. 2005) (applying merger of idea and expression to deny copyright to a parts
numbering and classification system and noting policy reasons for doing so); Southco, Inc. v.
Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276. 282 (3d Cir. 2004) (parts numbers lack originality because they are
dictated by the logic of an idea, namely the plaintiff's parts numbering system): Sassafras Enters., Inc.
v. Roshco, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 343, 346 37 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (promotional materials accompanying pizza
stone lack originality and idea/expression dichotomy requires limitation on breadth of possible
infringement claims by plaintiff). The Baker Court would likely have approved of these results, for it
cited Cobbett v. Woodward, (1872) 14 L.R. Eq. 407. an English case denying copyright in drawings
from a furniture catalog a form of commercial information work on the ground that the drawings
merely depicted works for sale. Baker, 101 U.S. at 106.
50. 140 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1944).
51. Id. at 182.
52. Id. at 183.
53. Id. at 182.
54. Id. at 184.
55. Id. at 184 (citing Baker v. Selden. 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1879)).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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it could see no other reasonable course of action. 9
On similar grounds, the District of Massachusetts, in Yankee Candle Co. v.
Bridgewater Candle Co.,60 denied a copyright claim by plaintiff Yankee Candle
against its competitor. The suit involved copyright in the labels for Yankee
Candle's popular "Housewarmer" line of candles.61 These rectangular labels
contained the Yankee Candle name at the top and "Housewarmer" at the bottom."
The labels also depicted the scent of the candles in question with a photograph and
the name of the fragrance.63 Thus, a eucalyptus scented candle would have a label
depicting eucalyptus leaves.64 In 1998, Bridgewater began marketing a competing
line of candles with labels that depicted the scent of the candles with Bridgewater's
own photographs and the name of the fragrance. 65 Yankee Candle objected and
sued for, among other things, copyright infringement. 6 The court granted summary
judgment for Bridgewater on the copyright claim.67
The court reasoned that the ideas behind the Yankee Candle labels merged with
their expression.68 In the court's opinion, very few ways existed for depicting
cinnamon or other fragrances. 9 Yankee Candle therefore had no cause of action for
copyright against Bridgewater unless Bridgewater's photographs were practically
identical to Yankee Candle's. ° Such similarity did not exist, so Yankee Candle's
claim had to fail."
For purposes of contrast, consider FMC Corp. v. Control Solutions, Inc.,72 a
case that demonstrates how courts sometimes reach results inconsistent with Crume
and Yankee Candle. In FMC, the plaintiff and defendant were competitors selling
essentially the same pesticide. 13 FMC, the plaintiff, marketed the pesticide first
under a patent.74 That marketing involved the use of a product label whose general
contents were partially required by the federal government.7 5 After the patent

59. Id.at 184 85 ("To hold that an idea, plan, method or art described in a copyright is open to
the public but that it can be used only by the employment of different words and phrases which mean
the same thing, borders on the preposterous. It is to exalt the accomplishment of a result by indirect
means which could not be done directly. It places a premium upon evasion and makes this the test of
infringement. Notwithstanding some authorities which support a theory permitting such a result, we
think it is wrong and disapprove it.").
60. 99 F. Supp. 2d 140 (D. Mass. 2000).
61. Id.at 143.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.at 148.
65. Id.at 143.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.at 144-45.
69. Id.
70. Id.at 146.
71. Id.at 147-50.
72. 369 F. Supp. 2d 539 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
73. Id.at 542.
74. Id.at 545.
75. Id.at 543.
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expired, the defendant Control Solutions began selling a generic version of the
formerly patented pesticide. 76 Control Solutions also had to include a product label
with the same required information that FMC had provided, and it complied by
copying FMC's label. FMC objected to this and sued for infringement. 78
Control Solutions had a very plausible argument for merger of idea and
expression. The required information for the product labels included information
about hazards and directions for use, identification of the pests against which the
pesticides were effective, and the application and mixing rates of the pesticides for
many uses. 79 Many expressions of such information may exist, but relatively few
would effectively convey the necessary information in a concise manner. If FMC
gained one or more copyrights that forced competitors to use less effective labels,
it would gain competitive advantages of the sort not contemplated by copyright.
Competitors forced to use less effective language might not receive government
approval to sell the pesticide, or their less effective warnings might increase their
exposure to product liability suits. And, of course, competitors who wanted to use
FMC's language would wind up paying a license fee that would serve as a de facto
royalty for a previously patented product now in the public domain.
Despite this, the court found no merger.8" It correctly noted that the issue was
whether the label's ideas could be expressed in many ways, 8 but it did not consider
that many possible expressions of the label's ideas would not effectively express
the ideas. This had the effect of multiplying significantly the number of available
expressions for the ideas, and the possibility of multiple expressions thus removed
any concerns about merger.8 2 Additionally, the court seemed unconcerned about the
possibly anti-competitive effects of giving FMC copyright, for it characterized the
merger of idea and expression as a "somewhat metaphysical issue" unrelated to
commerce and competition. 83
The divergent results of Sassafras, Abli, Crume, Yankee Candle, and FMC
expose the disagreement over the treatment of copyright in commercial information
works. The five cases shared many important similarities. All involved commercial
information works and plaintiffs who sued not for the purpose of protecting
copyright incentives for the creation of their works, but to hinder the lawful
marketing of a competitor's products. Deciding these cases in the plaintiffs' favor
therefore meant harming the public interest through the disruption of properly

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id. at 543, 549.
Id. at 553.
Id. at 543.
Id. at 556.
81. Id. at 566 (citing Dymow v. Bolton, I I F.2d 690, 691 (2d Cir. 1926)).
82. Id. at 567.
83. Id. ("Understandably. CS1 may well wish to demonstrate to its potential customers that its
product is identical in makeup and applications as TalstarOne, however, 'that is a commercial and
competitive objective which does not enter into the somewhat metaphysical issue of whether particular
ideas and expressions have merged.'(quoting Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714
F.2d 1240. 1253 (3d Cir. 1983))).
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functioning markets. The Sassafras, Crume, and Yankee Candle courts understood
this, and they refused to go along with the plaintiffs' claims. However, the Abli and
FMC courts seemed uninterested in these policy issues, and they reached very
different results.
Both sides of this disagreement have plausible support for their positions.
Obviously those who favor the Sassafras, Crume, and Yankee Candle position
would point to the negative consequences of extending copyright to commercial
information works. Those rejecting that position would argue that doctrinal
interpretations necessary to limit copyright in commercial information works would
have negative consequences in other parts of copyright. If courts want to limit
copyright in commercial information works, they will have to interpret the
copyright doctrine in a way that resolves doubts about copyrightability against
plaintiffs. While this might be a good idea for commercial information works,
courts would have to do the same thing for other works because copyright has no
doctrinal basis for treating commercial information works and other works
separately. This would mean denying copyright to some works, perhaps computer
programs or compilations of information, that should perhaps be copyrighted in
order to ensure their continued production. 4
The foregoing shows that conflict over copyright in commercial information
works amounts to disagreement about singling commercial information works out
for the kind of treatment to which other works might not be subject. Those favoring
limited copyright see no problem with making the suggested distinction, while
those taking the opposite position question its possibility and wisdom. This
seemingly intractable disagreement sets the stage for this Essay's inquiry about
wisdom the First Amendment may provide.
III.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S SPECIAL TREATMENT OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH

The distinct First Amendmentj urisprudence of commercial speech began in the
case of Valentine v. Chrestensen.8" In that case, Chrestensen owned and exhibited
for profit an old United States Navy submarine.86 Chrestensen discovered that his
attempted distribution ofthe handbill advertising the ship violated a local ordinance
prohibiting distribution in the streets of commercial and business advertisements.8

84. The outline of this argument appears in FC. Recall that the FMCcourt did not interpret the
idea/expression dichotomy with much concern for overbroad copyright. Instead, the court cited the case
of Apple Computer, in which the Third Circuit resolved doubts about the copyrightability of operating
system software in favor of the plaintiff Apple Computer. FMC, 369 F. Supp. 2d at 566-67 (citing
Apple Computer. 714 F.2d at 1240. 1245). Finally, the court asserted that extending copyright to FMC
served the public interest because FMC's investment deserved protection. Id. at 578. This assertion was.,
in candor, rather dubious. As noted earlier, FMC surely did not need the protection of copyright to have
sufficient incentive for creating the label in question. Accordingly, the court's assertion about the public
interest can best be understood as an argument that copyright best serves the public interest by resolving
doubts about copyrightability in favor of copyright.
85. 316U.S. 52 (1942).
86. Id. at 52.
87. Id. at 53.
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Christensen then created a handbill that displayed an advertisement for the
submarine on one side and a protest against the ordinance on the other.8" The police
told Christensen that his handbill still violated the ordinance, but that a handbill
displaying only the protest would not.89 Christensen distributed the handbills
anyway, and the police stopped him.9 ° Chrestensen sued, alleging violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment." He prevailed in both the District Court and Circuit Court
of Appeals, 9 2 but the Supreme Court reversed.93
In reversing, the Court stated that "the streets are proper places for the exercise
of the freedom of communicating information," and that government may not
unduly burden free speech in public places.9 4 However, the Court also stated that
the Constitution imposed "no such restraint" with respect to "purely commercial
advertising."95 The Court understood that one side of Chrestensen's handbill
communicated something besides advertising. However, the Court worried that
deciding in Chrestensen's favor would effectively destroy the law because
circumvention would become easy.96
Valentine suggested that "purely commercial advertising" receives no First
Amendment protection at all, but later courts have not interpreted the First
Amendment so narrowly. Instead, they have held that the First Amendment protects
commercial speech, but to a lesser extent than other "ordinary" speech.97 In the
leading case of Virginia State Boardof Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.,98 the Supreme Court explained why the First Amendment offers less
protection to commercial speech. The case involved a consumer challenge to the
constitutionality of a law providing that pharmacists committed "unprofessional
conduct" by advertising the price or amount of prescriptions drugs.99 According to
the Court, the law effectively prohibited such advertisement."'0 Not surprisingly, the
defendant-appellant Virginia State Board of Pharmacy contended that the First
Amendment did not protect commercial speech.' 0 ' The Court disagreed and
characterized the defendant's suggested approach as "simplistic.' 1 2 Instead, the

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 54.
92. Id.
93. Id.at 55.
94. Id.at 54.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 55.
97. See 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484. 502 (1996): Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, 507 U.S. 410. 422 (1993); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 562-63 (1980); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
772 & n.24 (1976).
98. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
99. Id.at 749-50.
100. Id. at 752.
101. Id. at 758.
102. Id. at 759.
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Court noted that advertisers do not lose First Amendment protection simply because
they speak to earn money. °3 Moreover, the Court considered commercial speech
indispensable to a free market economy and consideration of how to regulate or
modify such an economy.'0 4 10The
Court therefore held that the First Amendment
5
protects commercial speech.
This did not mean, however, that the First Amendment protected commercial
speech as vigorously as other speech. The Court identified some "commonsense
differences between speech that does 'no more than propose a commercial
transaction' and other varieties. ' First, disseminators of commercial speech can
verify the truth of their statements with relative ease.' Second, commercial speech
"may be more durable than other kinds."'1 8 The Court considered these
characteristics significant because they affected the likelihood that commercial
speech needed full First Amendment protection to flourish." 9
In the case of ordinary speech, the First Amendment prohibits government from
suppressing speech it deems false because such regulation creates a "chilling
effect."" Speakers do not know if they will face prosecution because it is often
difficult to ascertain the truth of controversial statements. Speakers become riskaverse to the possibility of prosecution because they worry that courts will
mistakenly find their speech false or that they themselves will unintentionally speak
falsely. Such risk aversion means that some speakers who would otherwise speak
the truth refrain from speaking at all, and the loss of such truthful speech harms
public discourse. The First Amendment remedies this problem by prohibiting
government from suppressing false speech with impunity."' When speakers realize
that government cannot prosecute them simply because their speech is false, they
become more willing to speak. In short, the First Amendment requires that
government tolerate at least some false speech to ensure the dissemination of true
speech." 2

103. Id. at 762.
104. Id. at 765 ("Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is
nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what
reason, and at what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy. the
allocation ofour resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions.
It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed.
To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable. And if it is indispensable to the
proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system. it is also indispensable to the formation of
intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered." (citations omitted)).
105. Id. at 770.
106. Id. at 771 n.24 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376. 385 (1973)).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254. 300-01 (1964) (Goldberg. J.,
concurring).
11. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269 70, 279 80; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323,
33940 (1974).
112. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72. 278-79: Gertz. 418 U.S. at 340-41.
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By contrast, there is little risk of such chill when the government prohibits false
commercial speech. As an initial matter, commercial speakers know if they speak
the truth, for they have accurate information about the goods and services that they
sell. This implies that commercial speakers worry less about being mistakenly
prosecuted than ordinary speakers because neither they nor the government will
likely err about the legality of commercial speech. Additionally, commercial
speakers will probably quickly overcome any chilling effect that may exist because
commercial imperatives give speakers particularly strong reasons to speak. 13 Thus,
there are fewer reasons to avoid suppressing false commercial speech for fear of
silencing speakers,114 and this led the VirginiaState Board of Pharmacy Court to
conclude that government could freely prohibit false or misleading commercial
speech." 5
IV. A

COMMERCIAL

SPEECH PERSPECTIVE ON COPYRIGHT

IN COMMERCIAL

INFORMATION WORKS

The jurisprudence of commercial speech affects copyright in commercial
information works in three ways. First, it supports a distinction between
commercial information works and other works in copyright. Remember that the
case for not limiting copyright in commercial information works rests in part on
concerns that courts cannot single such works out for special treatment. However,
if courts do this in First Amendment cases, it seems entirely reasonable for courts
to do likewise in copyright cases.
Second, it weakens the justification for granting copyright in commercial
information works. In cases explaining why copyright is constitutional, the
Supreme Court has clearly operated on the belief that copyright's economic
incentives significantly encourage the production of speech." 6 The importance of
this belief can hardly be understated. If society does not have significantly more
speech with copyright than without, the Court would find it difficult to describe
copyright as pro-speech. In short, copyright's constitutionality rests on the
assumption that significant amounts of speech would not exist but for copyright.
Things are very different for commercial speech. In VirginiaState Board of
Pharmacy,the Court observed that commercial speech is a hardy form of speech
that will likely flourish even when regulated." 7 If commercial speech exists
primarily to stimulate commercial interest in goods or services, then commercial
speakers communicate with the expectation of profiting from the sale of those
goods or services. To the extent that money motivates and enables speech,
commercial speech has plenty of motivation behind it, and government regulation

113. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 771-73.
116. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)) (copyright's purpose is to promote creation ofnewworks).
117. 425 U.S. at 772 n.24.
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will have relatively little effect on its existence.'18 This observation has huge
implications for copyright in commercial information works, for if people already
have strong motives for creating them, it is highly unlikely that copyright is
necessary to encourage their production. This strengthens the case for denying or
limiting copyright in commercial information works because society has little to
gain from copyright in those works."'
Third, the jurisprudence of commercial speech identifies reasons that society
would want people to repeat commercial information works and commit what
would otherwise be infringement. In Eldred,the Supreme Court stated that once a
person has created and disseminated speech, society has little to gain by having
another person repeat the message. 12 ° Accordingly, to the extent that copyright
limits those who copy the speech of others, the Court could safely minimize the
First Amendment significance of that suppression.
Here too, things are different with respect to commercial information works.
The Virginia State Board of Pharmacy Court noted that commercial speech gets
First Amendment protection because of the role it plays in disseminating
information to the public in our marketplace economy. 2 ' Thus, if a person sells
goods identical to those sold by a competitor, the public needs to know; there is a
First Amendment interest in ensuring dissemination of that information as long as
the speaker does not deceive the public.
This observation affects copyright in commercial information works because
plaintiffs generally assert copyright in those works to disrupt the commercial
messages of competitors. TheAbli plaintiff objected because he did not want others
to know that the defendant was selling the same beads.'22 Similarly, the FMC
plaintiff sued to force the defendant to change informative messages placed in the
defendant's pesticide labels.' 23 In both of these cases, the free dissemination of the
defendants' messages would have served the public interest by informing the public
about the characteristics of the goods for sale. This is the very reason that the First
Amendment values commercial speech, and it runs counter to the conventional
assertion that repeated messages have little constitutional value. Moreover, when
combined with the observation that commercial information works will be created
in the absence of copyright incentives, it strengthens the case for limiting copyright
in those works because the public has more to gain from the copying and

118. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564. n.6 (1980); Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 772, n.24.
119. See Lisa P. Ramsey, Intellectual PropertyRights in Advertising, 12 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REv. 189, 217-23 (2006) (noting that copyright incentives do little to encourage production
of advertisements because parties recoup the cost of production through the sales of other goods or
services).
120. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 ("[The First Amendment] bears less heavily when speakers
assert the right to make other people's speeches.").
121. 425 U.S. at 765.
122. See Abli, Inc. v. Standard Brands Paint Co., 323 F. Supp. 1400, 1402-03 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
123. See FMC Corp. v. Control Solutions, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 539, 542-43, 543 n.2 (E.D. Pa.
2005).
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dissemination of commercial information works than it does from copyrighting
them.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Essay explains how the First Amendment jurisprudence of commercial
speech strengthens the case for limiting copyright in commercial information works
when plaintiffs sue to disrupt the nonmisleading commercial messages of
competitors. However, there is plenty of work to do before these suggestions
become firm conclusions.
Some of the problems are definitional and conceptual. This Essay considers
commercial information works because their purpose of conveying basic
commercial information is similar to the Supreme Court's definition of commercial24
speech as "speech that does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction.,-'
By doing so, the influence of commercial speech jurisprudence on copyright
becomes clear. But what happens when courts confront the messy reality that some
works will convey basic commercial information about goods 12or services while also
providing entertainment of the sort associated with movies? 1
For example, consider advertisements of the sort made by Volkswagen to
promote its GTI automobile. 126 These ads do much more than convey basic
information about Volkswagens, for they also offer stylized, image-oriented
entertainment. When compared to cases like Sassafrass, Crume, Yankee Candle,
Abli, and FMC, it is much harder to say that the advertisements lack originality or
that their ideas merge with their expression. Nevertheless, it also seems quite likely
that these works would exist without copyright's incentives. Should courts therefore
interpret the law to limit copyright in these works?
While it might be tempting to answer questions like this in the affirmative, this
Essay chooses to leave its resolution for another day. Concepts like originality and
the idea/expression dichotomy may be slippery, but that does not preclude the
existence of works like the Volkswagen advertisements whose copyrightability
seems clear as a matter of doctrine. The policy observations associated with
commercial speech jurisprudence obviously raise provocative questions about the
wisdom of continuing to protect works like these with copyright, but it seems
premature to definitively conclude that copyright should not protect such works.
Other questions will arise as contexts change. For example, what happens when
the plaintiff has produced a commercial information work and the defendant has

124. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 771 n.24 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human
Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376. 385 (1973)).
125. This problem corresponds to ambiguity in the definition of commercial speech itself. See
Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 639 48
(1990) (discussing examples of commercial speech that do more than propose a commercial
transaction).
126. See GTI MkV, http://www.vw.com/gti/en/us/# (last visited May 22,2007) (allowing visitors
to the advertisement to view photos, take a 3600 tour of the car, and watch commercials and videos of
the product).
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used the plaintiff's work in a work that is "regular" speech? In situations like this,
one might argue that the case for limiting copyright becomes even stronger because
the First Amendment implications of suppressing the defendant's speech are more
serious than those associated with cases in which the defendant produces only a
commercial information work. Such policy, if ultimately accepted, could greatly
affect application of doctrines not considered in this Essay, such as fair use, perhaps
through determinations made about the nature of the copyrighted work and the
effect on the market for the copyrighted work. 2
Similarly, what happens if the plaintiffhas produced a regular, noncommercial
work, and the defendant has produced a commercial information work? It may be
appropriate to strongly enforce copyright in cases like this because the commercial
nature of the defendant's work lowers the First Amendment concerns over its
suppression. This might influence the fair use interpretation of the purpose for the
borrowing, and it may explain the existing pro-plaintiff implications of a finding
that a defendant's use is for commercial purposes.'28
Finally, it is interesting to consider the impact of commercial speech
jurisprudence in cases beyond commercial speech. If observations about the
hardiness of speech and the importance of its repetition suggest limiting copyright
in commercial information works, perhaps similar conclusions follow for other
types of speech. For example, copyright presently protects works authored by state
governments.'29 However, those works probably do not need copyright incentives
to assure their production, and society has a very strong interest in their free
reproduction and dissemination. Taxes, not copyright revenues, support state
reports about polluted rivers or laws created by state legislatures, and the public
ought to receive these reports freely. Given Congress's failure to deny copyright to
such works, it may be impossible to completely prevent state attempts to copyright
them. However, it would seem quite sensible to apply the fair use doctrine
vigorously on behalf of defendants who copy and disseminate such works.
Unfortunately, limitations of space and time prevent this Essay from exploring
these issues adequately. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the Essay has shown that the
First Amendmentjurisprudence of commercial speech raises important points about
copyright law and can help courts interpret the law to society's advantage.

127. This could happen in a number of interesting scenarios. A social critic might write a book
about the effect of advertisements and include reproductions to illustrate her point. Alternatively, a
movie maker might include a commercial information work as part of a movies scenery.
128. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000) (making the applicability of fair use partially dependent on
whether a defendant's use is for a commercial purpose): Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music. Inc.. 510 U.S.
569, 578-79 (1994) (noting commercial purpose is one of several relevant factors to consider in the
analysis of fair use and is not dispositive).
129. Copyright explicitly excludes federal works from protection, but not state works. 17 U.S.C.
§ 105 (2000).
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